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ABSTRACT This paper proposes a novel design and analyzes security performance of quantum key
distribution (QKD) protocol over free-space optics (FSO). Unlike conventional QKD protocols based on
physical characteristics of quantummechanics, the proposed QKD protocol can be implemented on standard
FSO systems using subcarrier intensity modulation binary phase shift keying and direct detection with a
dual-threshold receiver. Under security constraints, the design criteria for FSO transmitter and receiver,
in particular, the modulation depth and the selection of dual-threshold detection, respectively, is analytically
investigated. For the security analysis, quantum bit error rate, ergodic secret-key rate, and final key-creation
rate are concisely derived in novel closed-form expressions in terms of finite power series, taking into account
the channel loss, atmospheric turbulence-induced fading, and receiver noises. Furthermore, Monte-Carlo
simulations are performed to verify analytical results and the feasibility of the proposed QKD protocol.
INDEX TERMS Quantum key distribution (QKD), free-space optics (FSO), subcarrier intensity modulation
(SIM), binary phase shift keying (BPSK), atmospheric turbulence-induced fading, dual-threshold direct
detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the Internet and recent
advancements to the Internet of Things, the secure commu-
nications for sensitive information over the Internet plays
a very crucial role. Conventional security relies solely on
the secrecy of an encryption key based on cryptographic
algorithms. To achieve unconditional security, two legitimate
parties, namely Alice and Bob, must be able to share the
secret key over publicly unsecured communication chan-
nels. This is also known as the key distribution problem.
Unfortunately, conventional key distribution protocols rely-
ing on computational complexities are vulnerable to future
advances in computer hardware and algorithms. Therefore,
such protocols do not provide information-theoretic security,
i.e. without any condition of computational assumptions [1].
Quantum key distribution (QKD), on the other hand,
promises the principle unconditional security by applying
the law of quantum mechanics to securely distribute the key
between two legitimate parties in the presence of eavesdrop-
per(s), namely Yuen [2]. The first QKD protocol, widely
known as BB84 protocol, was proposed by Bennett and Bras-
sard [3], by which the legitimate sender (Alice) and receiver
(Bob) can achieve the secret-key sharing with randomly
generated signals encoded by two non-orthogonal quantum
states.
Owing to how the information is encoded, there exists
two major implementation methods of QKD protocols,
namely discrete variable (DV) and continuous variable (CV).
In DV-QKD systems, the key information is encoded onto
the discrete state of a single photon, such as the phase or
polarization [4]. The encoded photons are then transmitted
over the quantum channel and detected by a single-photon
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receiver. DV-QKD or single-photon based QKD has the
advantage of enabling long-range key distribution, however,
it requires the use of bulky and expensive single-photon
detectors. In contrast, CV-QKD systems encode the key infor-
mation on the continuous variables of coherent states con-
veyed by the amplitude and/or phase of weakly modulated
light pulses [5]. Compared to DV-QKD, CV-QKD is much
easier to implement as it is compatible with the standard opti-
cal telecommunication technologies and enables higher key
generation rates by using heterodyne/homodyne detection
instead of the single-photon counters. CV-QKD scheme has
been theoretically studied and experimentally implemented
both over optical fiber [6]- [10] and free-space optical (FSO)
communication links [11]- [14].
The key implementation issue with CV-QKD system nev-
ertheless arises from the heterodyne/homodyne detection
receiver, which results in high cost due to the require-
ment of the sophisticated phase-stabilized local light at
the receiver [15]. To avoid such issue and further sim-
plify CV-QKD systems, intensity modulation with dual-
threshold/direct detection (D-T/DD) over fiber CV-QKD
systems has been recently proposed [16]. Specifically, two
slightly intensity-modulated pulses, i.e. coherent states,
employing on-off keying (OOK) are sent from the trans-
mitter and directly detected by a PIN receiver with dual
thresholds. The idea behind this dual-threshold detection is to
mimic the sifting process of two non-orthogonal photon bases
by adjusting two thresholds at high and low levels of two
intensity-modulated signals with small amplitude difference.
Due to quantum noise, signals arriving at the receiver exceed
the thresholds randomly and uncorrelated for Eve and Bob.
When thresholds are not exceeded, the coherent states are
indistinguishable and Eve unavoidably introduces errors by
randomly guessing the states. In this way, the QKD function
can be achieved with simple configuration. To optimize the
setting of dual thresholds, channel-state information (CSI)
is required at the receiver. In optical fiber environments,
CSI estimation can be easily achieved due to the non-fading
channel characteristics.
Compared to optical fiber, nevertheless, FSO is more flex-
ible and cheaper to implement, especially when there is
an urgent need for quick deployment and/or re-deployment.
In addition, FSO is able to provide fiber-like data rate of
up to 10 Gbps [17], and is being considered for high-
capacity, interference-immune, and resilient backhaul solu-
tions in the fifth-generation (5G) mobile networks [18], [19].
More promisingly, with recent advances in quantum satellite
communication over long-distance FSO link from a satellite
to a ground station as well as inter-satellite communication,
the possibility of a global QKD network for secure commu-
nication is practically highlighted [20], [21].
Motivated by the pioneer work in [16] and the fact that
free-space QKD systems play an important role in future
QKD networks, our goal in this paper is to design a CV-
QKD protocol that can be feasibly and cost-effectively
implemented on standard horizontal FSO systems while
satisfying necessary security constraints. Particularly, our
contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We propose a novel free-space CV-QKD system using
dual-threshold/direct detection (D-T/DD) with subcar-
rier intensity modulation binary phase shift keying
(SIM/BPSK) signaling. Practically, CSI estimation for
D-T settings over fading channels in case of OOK sig-
naling is complicated due to the asymmetry of binary
signals (e.g., noise variances are different in bits ‘‘0’’
and ‘‘1’’). Therefore, the use of SIM/BPSK signaling
whose signals of bit ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘1’’ are symmetric over
the ‘‘zero’’ level will relax the CSI estimation over the
atmospheric turbulence-induced fading channels.
• To confirm the feasibility and reliability of the proposed
system, we analytically investigate the design criteria for
FSO transmitter and receiver, especially, the modulation
depth and the selection of values for D-T settings to
maintain the security in the proposed free-space QKD
system against a practical attacking strategy from the
eavesdropper Eve (i.e., unauthorized receiver attack),
with an assumption of fully trusted transmitting and
receiving devices at Alice and Bob.
• In addition, we analytically study the secrecy perfor-
mance of the proposed system by deriving, in newly
accurate closed-form expressions, the quantum bit-error
rate (QBER), ergodic secret-key rate, and final key-
creation rate, taking into account effects of atmospheric
channel and receiver noises. The well-known log-
normal and Gamma-Gamma distributions are adopted
to model the atmospheric turbulence in weak and
moderate-to-strong regimes, respectively. Monte-Carlo
(M-C) simulations are further implemented to confirm
the validity of the analytical results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides basic concepts and describes the oper-
ation of conventional BB84 protocol over an FSO system.
Section III then highlights the proposed design concept and
system model. The atmospheric turbulence-induced fading
channel is modeled and analyzed in Section IV. In Section V,
the system secrecy performance metrics are theoretically
investigated and derived in closed-form solutions in terms
of finite power series. Finally, useful numerical results are
discussed in Section VI, and the paper is concluded with
summarized key points and future outlook in Section VII.
II. CONVENTIONAL BB84 PROTOCOL OVER FSO
A. BB84 PROTOCOL
In this subsection, we provide operational steps of the con-
ventional BB84 protocol in support of the discussion in
subsequent sections, which are summarized in four steps as
follows [4].
Step 1: Alice randomly chooses between two linear polar-
ization bases
⊗
or
⊕
(i.e., rectilinear or diagonal bases) for
every bit that she wants to send. The two bases
⊗
and
⊕
constitute four polarization states (−45◦, 45◦) and (0◦, 90◦),
repsectively. For each chosen basis, Alice creates quantum
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FIGURE 1. A simplified block diagram of the conventional BB84 QKD protocol over an FSO
channel.
TABLE 1. An example of BB84 protocol.
bits, or ‘‘qubits’’, by encoding random bit values, ‘‘0’’ or ‘‘1’’,
using the following set of polarization codes
0 →
{
0◦ if
⊕
was chosen,
−45◦ if ⊗ was chosen, (1)
1 →
{
90◦ if
⊕
was chosen,
45◦ if
⊗
was chosen.
(2)
The encoded quantum bits are then transmitted over the
unsecured channel as discrete single-photons to Bob’s
receiver. An example of Alice’s qubits preparation can be
seen in Table 1.
Step 2: At the receiver, Bob detects the encoded photons
by a single-photon detector. To examine the encoded infor-
mation, a basis,
⊗
or
⊕
, is randomly used to measure each
photon in the corresponding polarization states. To this point,
if Alice’s encoding and Bob’s decoding bases are the same,
the corresponding bit value is read correctly with a high
probability. Otherwise, if the two bases are different,1 the
received photon is measured by one of two polarization states
of the used basis at Bob’s receiver. Thus, bits ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘1’’
are then decoded, corresponding to the measured polarization
states. This is also known as the sifting process as illustrated
in Table 1.
Step 3: After Step 2, the bit sequence detected by Bob
and the corresponding bit sequence transmitted by Alice
form their partially correlated raw keys. Through a public
channel, Alice broadcasts her basis choice for each bit of her
raw key, but not the bit value. Bob then reveals on which
detected photons the same basis was used tomeasure (without
1When the wrong basis is used to measure, the measurement changes the
original polarization state of the received photon to one of two polarization
states of the wrong basis [4].
revealing the bit value he decoded on each one). They both
discard photon measurements where Bob used a different
basis, which is 50% on average, leaving the remaining bits
as their sifted key, as shown in Table 1.
Step 4: In practice, Bob’s sifted key may contain errors due
to eavesdropping or channel/detector imperfections. To iden-
tify and remove the erroneous bits, Alice and Bob perform
information reconciliation by publishing a random sample
of their measurements over the public channel and using
error correction techniques to correct the transmission errors,
which ensures both keys are identical, forming their shared
error-free secret key. In addition, to reduce Eve’s knowledge
of the shared key, Alice and Bob apply the privacy amplifi-
cation process by using their shared keys to produce a new,
shorter key based on hash functions in such a way that Eve
has only negligible information about the new key.
The security of BB84 protocol, according to the laws
of quantum mechanics, lies in the fact that Alice encodes
her information in non-orthogonal states
⊕
or
⊗
so that
an eavesdropper Eve cannot sufficiently distinguish the
two states and errors unavoidably occur when she eaves-
drops [22].
B. FREE-SPACE QKD USING BB84 PROTOCOL
Illustratively, Fig. 1 shows the simplified schematic diagram
of a free-space QKD system employing the BB84 protocol.
At Alice’s side, a single-photon source is used to emit
single photons, which could be ideally achieved with the help
of a semiconductor quantum dot [23]. The single photons
are then polarized by a polarization controller driven by two
random streams of polarization bases and binary bits, which
are respectively generated by the random bases generator
and random bits generator [24]. The polarization controller
encodes the binary bits into random bases according to the
rules given in (1) and (2). The encoded photons are then
transmitted over an atmospheric turbulence-induced fading
channel to Bob. It is found that near-field atmospheric turbu-
lence imposes a modest decrease in the sift probability and an
increase in the conditional probability of error in BB84 [25].
At Bob’s side, a set of devices is invoked to measure the
received photons, including a 50/50 ordinary beam splitter
to provide a passive, random choice of polarization bases
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for a single photon, half-wave plates for converting the basis⊕
to
⊗
and vice versa, and polarizing beam splitters for
directing the incoming photons to the designated single-
photon detector. A single-photon detector is a device used
to detect the polarized photons. Recently, researchers have
successfully developed a practical superconducting nanowire
single-photon detector with record detection efficiency over
90% [26]. Based on the detection counted at the designated
single-photon detectors of corresponding polarization states,
the binary bits originally encoded byAlice on the polarization
states could be decoded. Details of the decoding mechanism
can be covered in [25] and [27].
III. PROPOSED DESIGN CONCEPT AND SYSTEM MODEL
A. PROPOSED DESIGN CONCEPT
In this section, we describe the design concept for the
implementation of the QKD protocol by using SIM/BPSK
signaling and D-T/DD. Using the proposed QKD protocol,
a CV-QKD function can be achieved and feasibly imple-
mented on standard FSO systems, with simple configurations
and sufficient security. Details are as follows.
Step 1: Alice transmits SIM/BPSK modulated signals, i.e.
coherent states, with a small modulation depth (0 < δ < 1),
corresponding to binary random bits ‘‘0’’ or ‘‘1’’ over the
atmospheric channel. The two modulated signals represent-
ing binary bits are two coherent states that are nonorthogonal
to each other. Thus, they play a similar role as nonorthogonal
bases in BB84 protocol.
FIGURE 2. The probability density function of Bob’s received signal over
atmospheric turbulence-induced fading channel, d0 and d1 are two levels
of the dual thresholds.
Step 2: The transmitting modulated signals are then
directly detected at Bob’s receiver using an avalanche pho-
todiode (APD). Fig. 2 shows the probability density function
(PDF) of Bob’s received BPSK signals influenced by the
atmospheric turbulence-induced fading channel and receiver
quantum noise, which are symmetric over the ‘‘zero’’ level.
By obtaining the CSI, two levels of the D-T, d0 and d1, can
be selected symmetrically over the ‘‘zero’’ level. The distri-
bution of the received signals has two peaks corresponding
to Alice’s bit ‘‘0’’ and bit ‘‘1’’, which overlap with each
other as the modulation depth is small compared to noise
variances. For the detected value x of the received current
signal, the detection rule can be expressed as
Decision =
0 if (x ≤ d0)1 if (x ≥ d1)X otherwise, (3)
where X represents the case that Bob creates no bit, which
corresponds to the case of wrong basis selection in the
BB84 protocol. It is noted that the random fluctuations in
the received signals over the atmospheric channel result in
random detection results of ‘‘0’’, X, and ‘‘1’’ at the D-T.
This randomness is uncorrelated with Eve’s one as it results
from channel fading and quantum noises. It is practical and
feasible to consider the signals arriving at Eve’s and Bob’s
receivers experience uncorrelated fading as Eve’s receiver
should be separated from Bob’s within distance in the order
of meters for possible eavesdropping, whereas correlation
appears when receivers’ separated spacing is in the order of
centimeters [28].
Step 3:Using a classical public channel, Bob notifies Alice
of the time instants he was able to create binary bits from
detected signals. Alice then discards bit values at time instants
that Bob created no bit. Now, Alice and Bob share an identical
bit string, which is the sifted key. By obtaining the CSI
estimation at the receiver, d0 and d1 can be adjusted, thus the
probability of sift at Bob’s receiver can be controlled.
Table 3 illustrates a simple example of the proposed pro-
tocol according to the above-mentioned operational steps.
Alice transmits bits ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘1’’ encoded onto SIM/BPSK
modulated signals at different time instants, with i0 and i1
are intensity-modulated current signals of bits ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘1’’,
which are symmetric over the ‘‘zero’’ level and controlled
by the modulation depth δ; d0 and d1 are two detection
thresholds at Bob’s receiver, adjusted by obtaining the CSI
estimation2, e.g. channel state h and noise variance σ 2N (it is
noted that noise variance is the same in bits ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘1’’
for BPSK signaling). At different time instants, depending
on the decision rule in (3), bits ‘‘0’’, ‘‘1’’, and ‘‘X’’ (no bit)
are created at Bob’s receiver. Over a public channel, Bob
notifies Alice of the time instants he created no bits (e.g.,
t2, t3, t4, t5) so that Alice can discard key bits transmitted at
the corresponding time instants, forming their shared sifted
key.
Step 4: Similar to the BB84 protocol, further information
reconciliation and privacy amplification can then be imple-
mented over the public channel to obtain the final secret key.
The security of this design concept can be explained as
follows. Firstly, the modulation depth δ of the SIM/BPSK
signals is chosen to be small enough in order that Eve cannot
fully distinguish the transmitted state. Eve can also try to use
2Here, it is assumed that perfect CSI can be obtained at Bob’s receiver. The
CSI can be estimated by taking advantage of the slowly-varying nature of the
FSO channel, i.e. fading remains constant over a large number of transmitted
bits for a coherence time in the order of milliseconds [29]. For instance,
a few pilot symbols may be transmitted from Alice to Bob so that Bob can
estimate the CSI of the fading channel. The data symbols transmitted from
Alice followed by the pilot symbols will experience similar channel fading.
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TABLE 2. Comparison between different QKD technologies.
FIGURE 3. The probability density function of Eve’s received signal over
atmospheric turbulence-induced fading channel with the optimal
threshold dE .
TABLE 3. An example of the proposed protocol.
D-T like Bob does, however, Eve’s signal fluctuation is uncor-
related to Bob’s one, thus the key bits created by Bob and Eve
do not match, as mentioned in Step 2. If Eve tries to decode
the key using the optimal threshold (which is dE at ‘‘zero’’
as illustrated in Fig. 3), she obtains measurements where the
two signals are strongly overlapped, thus she will suffer from
a high error rate, thereby reducing the knowledge gained by
Eve. Secondly, as mentioned in Steps 2 and 3, the probability
of sift can also be controlled by Bob via the D-T setting. This
means the amount of information shared between Alice and
Bob can be controlled. As a result, we can guarantee a positive
secrecy rate by properly adjusting the modulation depth and
D-T setting so that the mutual information between Alice and
Bob is always larger that that gained by Eve under various
eavesdropping strategies. Details of the security analysis for
the transmitter/receiver design of the proposed system will be
further discussed in Section VI.
Table 2 summarizes key characteristics of the proposed
system, i.e. non-coherent CV-QKD, in comparison with DV-
QKD andCV-QKD systems. The key features of the proposed
system include simplicity and cost-efficiency, since phase-
stabilized local laser or expensive single-photon detector
is not required. In particular, Intensity Modulation/Direct
Detection (IM/DD) systems are commercially available for
high data rate, i.e., Gigabits per second (Gbps), and most
advantageous for single-wavelength data transmission over
short distances.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 4 presents a block diagram of the proposed free-space
CV-QKD system using SIM/BPSK and D-T/DD receiver
with an APD.
At the transmitter, the source data d(t) is first modulated
onto a radio frequency (RF) subcarrier signal using BPSK
scheme in which bits ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘1’’ are represented by two
different phases 180◦ apart. The subcarrier signal m(t) is
sinusoidal having both positive and negative values; therefore
a DC bias is added to m(t) before it is used to modulate a
continuous-wave laser beam. Let Pt (t) denote the transmitted
power of the modulated laser beam, we have
Pt (t) = P2 [1+ δm (t)] , (4)
where P represents the peak transmitted power, δ is the inten-
sity modulation depth (0 < δ < 1) to avoid overmodulation
(−1 < δm (t) < 1). m(t) = A(t)g(t)cos(2pi fct + aipi ),
where A(t) is the subcarrier amplitude, g(t) is the rectangular
pulse shaping function, fc is the subcarrier frequency, and
ai ∈ [0, 1] represents the ith binary data. For the sake of
simplicity, we normalize the power ofm(t) to unity [30], [31].
At the receiver, the incoming optical field is passed through
an optical bandpass filter (OBPF) before being converted into
an electrical signal through DD at the APD. A standard RF
coherent demodulator is employed to recover the source data
dˆ(t). Thus, the electrical signal at the output of the APD at
the receiver can be written as
ir (t) = <g¯P2 h (t) [1+ δm(t)]+ n (t) , (5)
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FIGURE 4. A block diagram of the proposed free-space QKD system using SIM/BPSK and
D-T/DD with an APD receiver.
where < = ηq
h˜v
is the responsivity (in units of A/W) of
the APD with η is the quantum efficiency, q is the electron
charge, h˜ is the Planck’s constant, v is the optical frequency;
g¯ is the average APD gain, and n(t) is the receiver noise. Since
the turbulence-induced fading h (t) varies slowly enough,
the DC term {<g¯P2 h (t)} can be filtered out by the OBPF [32].
The electrical signal ir (t) is then passed through the BPSK
demodulator shown in Fig. 4, where the output signal r(t) is
demodulated by the reference signal cos(2pi fct) as [32]
r (t)= ir (t)cos(2pi fct) =
{
i0 = −14<g¯Pδh(t)+ n(t)
i1 = 14<g¯Pδh(t)+ n(t)
, (6)
where i0 and i1 represent the received current signals for bits
‘‘0’’ and ‘‘1’’, respectively. Assuming that the dark current
is negligible, the receiver noises composing of shot noise,
background noise, and thermal noise can be modeled as addi-
tive white Gaussian noises (AWGN) with high accuracy [32].
Thus, n(t) is the zero-mean AWGN with variance
σ 2N = σ 2sh + σ 2b + σ 2th, (7)
where σ 2sh, σ
2
b , and σ
2
th are respectively the variances of the
APD shot noises caused by the received signal, background
radiation, and receiver thermal noise, which can be subse-
quently expressed as
σ 2sh = 2qg¯2<FA
(
1
4
Pδh
)
1f , (8)
σ 2b = 2qg¯2<FAPb1f , (9)
σ 2th =
4kBTFn
RL
1f , (10)
where FA = kAg¯+
(
2− 1g¯
)
(1− kA) denotes the excess noise
factor with kA is the ionization factor, Fn is the amplifier
noise figure, Pb is the average received background radiation
power, 1f = Rb2 with Rb is the system bit rate, T is the
receiver temperature in Kelvin degree, and RL is the APD’s
load resistance.
After demodulating process, the demodulated electrical
signal is being sampled and then used to create binary bits
‘‘0’’, ‘‘1’’, and no bit (i.e., X), based onD-T/DDwith decision
rules as described in Section III-A, forming Bob’s raw key.
Bob then notify Alice of the time instants that only bits ‘‘0’’
and ‘‘1’’ were created so that Alice can discard the key bits
transmitted at other time instants, forming the sifted key.
IV. ATMOSPHERIC CHANNEL MODELS
In our model, the channel coefficient h can be described
as h = hlht , where hl is the channel loss including atmo-
spheric attenuation and geometric spreading loss of the opti-
cal beam due to optical diffractions, and ht is the atmospheric
turbulence-induced fading.
A. CHANNEL LOSS
The channel loss induced by atmospheric attenuation
described by the exponential Beer-Lambert’s Law and geo-
metric spreading loss can be formulated as
hl = A
pi
(
θ
2L
)2 exp(−βlL), (11)
in which A = pi (D/2)2 is the area of the receiver aperture
with D is the diameter, θ is the angle of divergence, βl is the
attenuation coefficient, and L is the transmission distance in
kilometers [33].
B. ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCE-INDUCED FADING
Inhomogeneities in the temperature and pressure of the atmo-
sphere lead to refractive-index variations along the trans-
mission path, which is commonly known as atmospheric
turbulence. An optical wave propagating through the atmo-
sphere is affected by atmospheric turbulence, leading to the
irradiance (i.e., intensity) fluctuations, also known as scin-
tillation or fading, observed at the receiver. To statistically
characterize the atmospheric turbulence-induced fading,
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log-normal (LN) and Gamma-Gamma (GG) distribution
models have been widely used for characterizing weak and
moderate-to-strong turbulence regimes, respectively.
1) LOG-NORMAL TURBULENCE MODEL
For weak turbulence conditions, the PDF of turbulence-
induced fading coefficient ht , governed by the LN distribu-
tion, can be expressed as [34]
fLN (ht ) = 1√
8pihtσx
exp
(
−
[
ln(ht )− 2µx
]2
8σ 2x
)
, (12)
where µx and σ 2x are the mean and standard variance of
log-amplitude fluctuation. To ensure that the fading does not
attenuate or amplify the average power, we normalize the
fading coefficient so that E[ht ] = 1, with E[·] denotes the
statistical expectation. Doing so requires the choice of µx =
−σ 2x . Assuming plane wave propagation, σ 2x can be given as
σ 2x = 0.307
(
2pi
λ
)7/6
L11/6C2n , (13)
where λ is the wavelength and L is the transmission distance
in meters. C2n stands for the refractive index structure coeffi-
cient, which varies from 10−17 to 10−13 [33].
2) GAMMA-GAMMA TURBULENCE MODEL
For moderate-to-strong turbulence conditions, the PDF of
fading coefficient ht , modeled by a GG distribution, is given
as [35]
fGG
(
ht
)= 2 (αβ)(α+β)/2
0 (α) 0 (β)
(
ht
) α+β
2 −1 × Kα−β
(
2
√
αβht
)
,
(14)
where0(·) represents the Gamma function defined as0(w) 1=∫∞
0 t
w−1e(−t)dt , Kα−β (·) is the modified Bessel function of
the second kind of order
(
α − β); α > 0 and β > 0 are
the effective numbers of small-scale and large-scale eddies of
scattering environment, respectively. Assuming a plane wave
propagation, α and β are approximately expressed as
α ∼=
[
exp
(
0.49σ 2R
(1+ 1.11σ 12/5R )7/6
)
− 1
]−1
, (15)
β ∼=
[
exp
(
0.51σ 2R
(1+ 0.69σ 12/5R )5/6
)
− 1
]−1
, (16)
where σ 2R is the Rytov variance given as
σ 2R = 1.23
(
2pi
λ
)7/6
L11/6C2n . (17)
The Rytov variance in (17) is used to characterize the strength
of atmospheric turbulence. According to [36, Fig. 3], with
λ = 1550 nm, the changes in values of C2n and L classify
σ 2R into three categories, σ
2
R < 1, σ
2
R ≈ 1, and σ 2R > 1 that
respectively define weak, moderate, and strong turbulence
conditions. As a result, having known C2n and L, one can
determine the turbulence conditions accordingly.
FIGURE 5. Impact of atmospheric turbulence-induced fading on electrical
BPSK signal at the receiver.
C. IMPACT OF ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCE
ON BPSK SIGNALING
To illustrate the impact of atmospheric turbulence-induced
fading on electrical BPSK signaling at the receiver, Fig. 5
shows an example of transmitting 100 sample bits using
BPSK-modulated signaling over an FSO link, with the data
rate Rb = 1 Gbps and transmission distance L = 1 km,
under the impact of weak and moderate-to-strong turbulence
conditions modeled by LN (e.g., C2n = 10−15) and GG
(e.g., C2n = 10−14) distributions, respectively. As is evident,
the BPSK signaling received at the receiver suffers from
fluctuations due to atmospheric turbulence. Especially, when
turbulence becomes stronger, the electrical signal amplitude
is severely fluctuated, which consequently results in highly
noisy BPSK symbols in the constellation plane at the receiver,
as shown in Fig. 6.
V. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. QUANTUM BIT ERROR RATE
In BB84 protocol, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) can be
defined as [4], [25]
QBER = Perror
Psift
, (18)
where Perror and Psift are the probabilities of error and sift,
respectively. Specifically,Psift is the probability that Bob uses
the same bases as Alice’s to measure the received photons,
fromwhich he decodes a string of bits called sifted key; Perror
is the probability that there is a number of erroneous bits
in the sifted key, caused by technical imperfections and/or
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TABLE 4. Joint probabilities between Alice and Bob averaged over atmospheric turbulence-induced fading channels.
FIGURE 6. Impact of atmospheric turbulence-induced fading on electrical
BPSK constellation at the receiver.
Eve’s intervention. Thus, QBER reflects the percentage of
bit errors in the sifted key. These errors are on the order of
a few percent, hence QBER strongly contrasts with the 10−9
commonly known in optical communications [4]. As a result,
the name QBER is used to clearly distinguish it from the bit
error rate (BER) used in standard optical communications.
Similar to BB84 protocol, we use the metric QBER in (18)
with the same purpose of reflecting the bit error rate in the
sifted key. Particularly in our proposed system, Psift cor-
responds to the probability that Bob can detect bits ‘‘0’’
and ‘‘1’’ using the dual-threshold detection, and Perror is
the probability that Bob mistakenly decides ‘‘0’’ when ‘‘1’’
was transmitted and vice versa. These probabilities can be
calculated through the joint probabilities between Alice and
Bob, respectively given as
Psift = PA,B(0,0)+PA,B(0,1)+PA,B(1, 0)+PA,B(1,1),
(19)
Perror = PA,B(0, 1)+ PA,B(1, 0). (20)
From (19) and (20), QBER can be derived as in (18). Let us
denote PA,B(a, b) (a, b ∈ {0, 1}) as the joint probability that
Alice’s bit ‘‘a’’ coincides with Bob’s bit ‘‘b’’, defined as
PA,B(a, b) = PA(a)PB|A(b|a), (21)
where PA(a) = 12 is the probability that Alice sends bit
‘‘a’’ (a ∈ {0, 1}), since ‘‘1’’ and ‘‘0’’ are equally likely
to be transmitted from Alice. PB|A(b|a) is the conditional
probability that Bob creates bit ‘‘b’’ when Alice sends bit
‘‘a’’. Using two detection thresholds d0 and d1 and decision
rule in (3), the joint probabilities between Alice and Bob,
averaged over the fading channel, are listed in Table 4.
From Table 4, the joint probabilities when Alice transmits
bits ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘1’’, averaged over the fading channel, can be
respectively expressed as
PA,B(a, 0) = 12
∫ ∞
0
Q
(
ia − d0
σN
)
fht
(
ht
)
dht , (22)
PA,B(a, 1) = 12
∫ ∞
0
Q
(
d1 − ia
σN
)
fht
(
ht
)
dht , (23)
where a ∈ {0, 1}, i0 = −14<g¯Pδhlht and i1 = −i0. Q(·)
1=
1√
2pi
∫∞
0 exp(−t2/2)dt is the Gaussian Q-function.
To determine d0 and d1 in (22) and (23), we propose the
D-T selections as follows
d0 = E[i0]− ζ
√
σ 2N and d1 = E[i1]+ ζ
√
σ 2N , (24)
where ζ is the dual-threshold scale coefficient to adjust d0
and d1. σ 2N is the noise variance defined in (7).E[i0] andE[i1]
are the mean values of i0 and i1, respectively. Thus, E[i0] =
− 14<g¯Pδhl and E[i1] = 14<g¯Pδhl as E[h] = E[hlht ] = hl
with E[ht ] = 1 as the mean irradiance is normalized to
unity [30]. It is deduced from (24) that the D-T selections
depend on two parameters, which are the modulation depth
δ and D-T scale coefficient ζ . By adjusting δ and ζ , we are
able to control Psift , Perror , and QBER of the QKD system.
1) QBER OVER LOG-NORMAL CHANNELS
The joint probabilities in (22) and (23), over LN channels, can
be respectively derived in closed-form expressions as
PA,B(a, 0)≈ 12√pi
k∑
i=−k,i6=0
ωiQ
(
∓14<g¯Pδhle2
√
2σxxi+2µx−d0
σN−i
)
,
(25)
PA,B(a, 1)≈ 12√pi
k∑
i=−k,i6=0
ωiQ
(
d1± 14<g¯Pδhle2
√
2σxxi+2µx
σN−i
)
,
(26)
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where
σN−i
=
√
2qFAg¯2<
[
1
4
Pδhle2
√
2σxxi+2µx + Pb
]
1f + 4kbTFn
RL
1f ,
(27)
d0 = E[i0]− ζ
√
σ 2N−i, (28)
d1 = E[i1]+ ζ
√
σ 2N−i. (29)
Here, k is the order of approximation, {ωi} and {xi}
(i = −k,−k + 1, ...− 1, 1, 2, ..., k) are weight factors and
zeros of the Hermite polynomial, respectively [37]. The proof
of (25) and (26) can be found in Appendix VII. By plugging
(25) and (26) into (19) and (20), the closed-form solution for
the QBER in (18) can be obtained. It is noted that k = 10
gives accurate results for this approximation [34].
2) QBER OVER GAMMA-GAMMA CHANNELS
The joint probabilities in (22) and (23), over GG channels,
can be respectively derived in closed-form expressions as
PA,B(a, 0)≈ 12
N∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
aiξ
−bi
i νlτ
bi−1
l Q
(∓ 14ξi<g¯Pδhlτl−d0
σN−i,l
)
,
(30)
PA,B(a, 1)≈ 12
N∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
aiξ
−bi
i νlτ
bi−1
l Q
(
d1± 14ξi<g¯Pδhlτl
σN−i,l
)
,
(31)
where
σN−i,l =
√
2qFAg¯2<
[
1
4ξi
Pδhlτl+Pb
]
1f + 4kbTFn
RL
1f , (32)
d0 = E[i0]− ζ
√
σ 2N−i,l, (33)
d1 = E[i1]+ ζ
√
σ 2N−i,l . (34)
Here, ai, bi, and ζi are parameters of a mixture-Gamma (MG)
distribution chosen to approximate the GG distribution, with
N is the number of mixture components [38]. νl and τl are
weight factors and abscissas of the Laguerre polynomials,
withM is the number of iteration to numerically approximate
Laguerre integration [37, Table 25.9]. The detailed proof
of (30) and (31) is provided in Appendix VII. By plugging
(30) and (31) into (19) and (20), the closed-form solution for
the QBER in (18) can be derived. It is noted thatN = M = 10
gives accurate results for this approximation [38].
B. ERGODIC SECRET-KEY RATE & FINAL
KEY-CREATION RATE
To validate the security of the proposed system, we ana-
lyze the ergodic secret-key rate, denoted as S, over the
atmospheric fading channels. If S is positive, it is theo-
retically possible that the amount of information gained
by Eve can be decreased through the process of privacy
amplification [39]. When S is negative, Bob must be able to
detect Eve’s intervention with Eve is limited solely by laws
of physics [40]. After sharing key bit information and per-
forming error correction, Alice and Bob estimate the amount
of information leaked to Eve, and exclude it by means of
privacy amplification to obtain the final key. From the infor-
mation theoretical viewpoint, we denote H (B) and H (E) as
the information entropies of Bob and Eve, respectively. The
conditional entropies of Bob-Alice and Eve-Alice are denoted
as H (B|A) and H (E|A), respectively. The mutual information
I (A;B) and I (A;E) are defined as the estimation of the
amount of information shared between Alice and Bob, and
that shared between Alice and Eve, respectively expressed as
I (A;B) = H (B)− H (B|A), (35)
I (A;E) = H (E)− H (E|A), (36)
in which the key is said to be secure if I (A,B) is higher than
I (A,E) [41]. As a result, we define the ergodic secret-key rate
as the maximum transmission rate at which the eavesdropper
is unable to decode any information, given as [41]
S = I (A;B)− I (A;E). (37)
It is noted that the expression of S in (37) corresponds to the
uni-directional error correction protocol in the information
reconciliation process, in which the error correcting infor-
mation is sent from Alice through the public channel to
Bob (in order for him to error-correct his data) and eaves-
dropped by Eve. Thus, the leaked amount of information
from Alice to Eve, i.e. I (A;E), should be excluded to obtain
a secure key. Other types of error correction protocols, e.g.
bidirectional or reverse reconciliation [16], [42], can also be
employed, however, they are not considered in this paper for
the sake of conciseness. In practice, the error correction effi-
ciency should be taken into account in investigating I (A;B),
nevertheless, we assume perfect error correction efficiency,
i.e. 100%, as an upper bound evaluation of the system perfor-
mance [16].
From (37), the useful bit rate, namely final key-creation
rate, after error correction and privacy amplification to
exclude the amount of information leaked to Eve from that
shared between Alice and Bob, denoted as Rf , can be derived
as
Rf = Rs(I (A;B)− I (A;E)), (38)
where Rs is the sifted-key rate or raw-key rate, i.e. the length
of the raw key that can be produced per unit time that contains
the sifting factor, given as Rs = PsiftRb with Rb is the system
bit rate [43].
To obtain S and Rf , the mutual information I (A;B) and
I (A;E) over both LN and GG atmospheric turbulence chan-
nels are derived as follows.
1) MUTUAL INFORMATION BETWEEN ALICE AND BOB,
I(A;B)
Alice and Bob share information over the channel as depicted
in Fig. 7, where xi (i ∈ {1, 2}) represents bit ‘‘0’’ or ‘‘1’’,
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TABLE 5. Joint probabilities between Alice and Eve averaged over atmospheric turbulence-induced fading channels.
FIGURE 7. Diagram of the binary erasure channel (BEC) with errors
between Alice and Bob.
and yj (j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) denotes bit ‘‘0’’, X , or ‘‘1’’, respectively.
p and q are the channel transition probabilities. α and (1 −
α) are the probabilities of transmitting bits ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘1’’.
We refer to this type of channel as the binary erasure chan-
nel (BEC) with errors [44]. Hence, the mutual information
I (A;B) can be derived as
I (A;B) = plog2(p)+ (1− p− q)log2(1− p− q)
−(αp+(1−α)(1−p−q))log2(αp+(1−α)(1−p−q))
−(α(1−p−q)+(1−α)p)log2((α(1−p−q)+(1−α)p)).
(39)
The detailed proof of (39) can be found in Appendix VII.
In our system, we have α = 0.5 since the probabilities of
transmitting bits ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘1’’ are equally likely to occur.
p, q, and (1 − p − q) are respectively the conditional prob-
abilities that Bob creates bit yj when Alice sends bit xi,
which can be deduced from the joint probabilities derived in
Section V-A.
2) MUTUAL INFORMATION BETWEEN ALICE AND EVE,
I(A; E)
In our system, Eve obtains a bit string through eavesdropping
using the optimal detection threshold dE = 0, whose bit
values are partially identical to Alice’s. Thus, we can consider
that Alice and Eve share some information via binary sym-
metric channel (BSC). As a result, the mutual information
I (A;E) can be given as [4], [41]
I (A;E) = 1+ pelog2(pe)+ (1− pe)log2(1− pe), (40)
where pe is the transition probability that Eve correctly
detects the transmitted bits. Let e be Eve’s error probability,
which is defined as
e = PA,E (0, 1)+ PA,E (1, 0), (41)
with PA,E (0, 1) and PA,E (1, 0) are the joint probabilities that
Eve falsely detects Alice’s transmitted bits using threshold
detection dE = 0, respectively expressed as
PA,E (0, 1)= 12
∫ ∞
0
Q
(
dE+ 14<g¯Pδhlht
σN
)
fht
(
ht
)
dht , (42)
PA,E (1, 0)= 12
∫ ∞
0
Q
(
1
4<g¯Pδhlht−dE
σN
)
fht
(
ht
)
dht . (43)
Similar to Section V-A, the joint probabilities between Alice
and Eve, averaged over the fading channel, are summarized
in Table 5. Following the same approach as presented in
Section V-A, the joint probabilities PA,E (0, 1), PA,E (1, 0),
and Eve’s probability of error e can also be derived in closed-
form expressions as in (44) and (45) (over LN channels); (46)
and (47) (over GG channels), respectively.
PA,E (0, 1)≈ 12√pi
k∑
i=−k,i6=0
ωiQ
(
dE+ 14<g¯Pδe2
√
2σxxi+2µx
σN−i
)
,
(44)
PA,E (1, 0)≈ 12√pi
k∑
i=−k,i6=0
ωiQ
(
1
4<g¯Pδe2
√
2σxxi+2µx−dE
σN−i
)
.
(45)
PA,E (0, 1)≈ 12
N∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
aiξ
−bi
i νlτ
bi−1
l Q
(
dE+ 14ξi<g¯Pδhlτl
σN−i,l
)
,
(46)
PA,E (1, 0)≈ 12
N∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
aiξ
−bi
i νlτ
bi−1
l Q
(1
4ξi
<g¯Pδhlτl−dE
σN−i,l
)
.
(47)
All notations in (44)-(47) are already defined in
Section V-A. Plugging (44)-(47) into (41), closed-form
expressions for Eve’s probability of error can be derived over
both LN and GG channels.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The appeal of QKD protocols mainly comes from the fact
that it can provide unconditional security, which means that
the security can be proved without imposing any restriction
on the computational resources or the manipulation tech-
niques that are available to the eavesdropper acting on the
signal [43]. This should not be considered as a synonym for
absolute security, which does not exist in any key distribution
scheme with security dependent on physical characteristics
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due to system imperfections and eavesdropper’s attacks. The
definition of security is indeed a quantitative issue, and there
is yet no true valid quantification of QKD security under
all possible attacks [2]. As our proposed QKD protocol is
based on standard FSO systems with classical signals, simple
physical-layer eavesdropping is the most powerful strategy.
Several important attacks in quantum cryptography, such as
collective attacks and coherent attacks, cannot be beyond the
eavesdropping strategy for classical signals [45].
In standard FSO systems, the physical-layer security was
analyzed, both theoretically and experimentally, under sev-
eral popular Eve’s attacking strategies [46]- [48]. Particu-
larly, based on the same concept of D-T/DD receiver as
in [49], the security analysis was comprehensively performed
for two-way free-space QKD systems, under unauthorized
receiver attack (URA), beam-splitting attack (BSA), and
intercept-resend attack (IRA) [48]. In [49], it is confirmed
that the proposed one-way free-space QKD system using
SIM/BPSK and D-T/DD was secured against IRA with high
probability of detecting Eve (more than 99%) over short
key length, and some initial results under URA were also
discussed. As the optical beamwidth in FSO systems is very
narrow and invisible, it is extremely difficult for Eve to
intercept in the middle of the transmission between Alice and
Bob to perform IRA. In addition, surveillance cameras can
be installed at Alice to prevent Eve from performing BSA
by locating its receiver near Alice as theoretically assumed
in [47] and [48]. Therefore, the most practical attacking strat-
egy for Eve is the URA, by locating its unauthorized receiver
within the beam footprint near and/or behind Bob’s receiver,
since the optical beam experiences geometric spreading as
analyzed in Section IV-A.
In this paper, we aim to prove that our proposed QKD
protocol, with proper transmitter and receiver settings, is able
to achieve positive ergodic secret-key rate (S > 0) in the
presence of Eve, thus a secure key can be shared between
Alice and Bob. Eve is assumed to be equipped with an APD
at her receiver and perform URA near and/or behind Bob’s
receiver. Transmitting/receiving devices at Alice and Bob are
fully trusted. Illustratively, Fig. 8 shows the beam footprints
with corresponding radiuses r (m) affected by geometric
spreading after transmitting over a distance of L (km), with
angle of divergence θ = 10−3 rad. This figure serves as a
reference for the possible positions that Eve can locate her
unauthorized receiver within the beam footprint near and/or
behind Bob’s receiver.
B. SYSTEM DESIGN CRITERIA
In this section, we investigate the criteria for Alice’s transmit-
ter and Bob’s receiver settings to maintain the security of the
proposed system under URA. Secrecy performance metrics
are analytically analyzed and in a good agreement with M-
C simulations. The system parameters and constants used in
the analysis are shown in Table 6. For a transmission distance
of 1 km, the values of C2n = 10−15, C2n = 5 × 10−14, and
C2n = 10−13 correspond to the weak, moderate, and strong
FIGURE 8. Beam footprint with radius r (m) at distance L (km) away from
Alice’s transmitter, with angle of divergence θ = 10−3 rad.
TABLE 6. System Parameters and Constants [16], [32], [34].
turbulence conditions. LN and GGmodels are used to charac-
terize weak and moderate-to-strong turbulence, respectively.
LA,B and LE,A are the transmission distances between Alice-
Bob and Eve-Alice, respectively.
1) ALICE’S TRANSMITTER DESIGN
In URA, Eve tries to steal information by tapping the trans-
mitted signal within the beam footprint near and/or behind
Bob’s receiver. To defend against this attack, Alice chooses
a small value of modulation depth δ at the transmitter so that
Eve will suffer from a high error rate with dE = 0. Assuming
that LA,B = 1 km and Eve is close to Bob’s receiver, e.g.
LE,A = 1 km, Fig. 9 investigates Eve’s error rate e, under
weak turbulence condition, to find out the proper selection
of δ to guarantee that e is sufficiently high, e.g. e > 0.1,
while Eve tries to lower e by choosing its optimal average
APD gain g¯. It is seen that the chosen values for δ should be
δ ≤ 0.4, thus, e > 0.1 is always guaranteed even when Eve
selects its optimal g¯ = 15.
In Fig. 10, with g¯ = 15 and LA,B = 1 km, we confirm the
selection of δ by letting Eve locate its receiver within 1 km
behind Bob’s receiver. The turbulence parameter is set at
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FIGURE 9. Eve’s error probability (e) versus intensity modulation depth
(δ) and average APD gain (g¯). LE,A = 1 km, P = 0 dBm, C2n = 10−15
(LN model).
FIGURE 10. Eve’s error probability (e) versus intensity modulation depth
(δ) and Eve’s distance from Alice (LE,A). g¯ = 15, P = 0 dBm, C2n = 10−14
(GG model).
C2n = 10−14 so that Eve will experience moderate-to-strong
turbulence conditions as LE,A increases. It is seen that when
Eve moves further, the received signal at Eve’s receiver suf-
fers from stronger turbulence-induced fading, which results
in higher e. Therefore, with δ ≤ 0.4, it is confirmed that
e > 0.1 while Eve performs URA near and/or behind Bob’s
receiver.
Furthermore, in Fig. 11, when LE,A = 1 km, we investigate
the impact of different turbulence conditions on Eve’s error
probability along with the selection of modulation depth δ.
It is observed that by choosing δ ≤ 0.4, Eve’s error probabil-
ity is always higher than 0.1 under all turbulence conditions.
It is noted that themodulation depth should not be too small as
it considerably increases the bit errors at Bob, which might be
unable to correct using error-correction codes. In this paper,
for further performance analysis, δ = 0.4 is chosen.
FIGURE 11. Eve’s error probability (e) versus intensity modulation depth
(δ). g¯ = 15, LE,A = 1 km, P = 0 dBm, C2n = 10−15 (LN model),
C2n = 5× 10−14 and C2n = 10−13 (GG model).
FIGURE 12. Bob’s QBER and Psift versus the D-T scale coefficient (ζ ),
under (a) weak (C2n = 10−15, modeled by LN), and (b) strong (C2n = 10−13,
modeled by GG) turbulence conditions. δ = 0.4, LA,B = 1 km, g¯ = 15,
P = 0 dBm.
2) BOB’S RECEIVER DESIGN
Regarding the criteria for receiver design, we can control
QBER and Psift by adjusting d0 and d1 through ζ , as shown
in Fig. 12. Our target is to control Psift ≥ 10−2 so that the
probability of sift is sufficient for Bob to receive information
from Alice (e.g., to achieve at least a sifted-key rate at Mbps
with typical transmission rates at Gbps of standard FSO
systems). At the same time, we also want to keep QBER
≤ 10−3 so that errors can be feasibly corrected at Mbps
sifted-key rate by error-correction codes. After performing
error correction to correct errors in the sifted key and privacy
amplification to remove Eve’s information, Alice and Bob
can then share a shorter key, i.e. final secure key. Doing so
requires the choice of 1.2 ≤ ζ ≤ 2.35 under weak turbulence
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FIGURE 13. Ergodic secret-key rate (S) versus D-T scale coefficient (ζ ) and
Eve-Alice distance (LE,A) in km. δ = 0.4, LA,B = 1 km, g¯ = 15, P = 0 dBm,
C2n = 10−14 (modeled by GG).
FIGURE 14. Ergodic secret-key rate (S) versus D-T scale coefficient (ζ ) and
Eve-Alice distance (LE,A) in km. δ = 0.4, LA,B = 1 km, g¯ = 15, P = 0 dBm,
C2n = 10−15 (modeled by LN).
conditions (Fig. 12(a)), and 1.9 ≤ ζ ≤ 4.35 under strong
turbulence conditions (Fig. 12(b)).
In Figs. 13 and 14, we look at another aspect of the per-
formance metric in receiver design by showing the ergodic
secret-key rate S versus ζ and Eve-Alice distance LE,A under
moderate-to-strong (Fig. 13) and weak (Fig. 14) turbulence
conditions. It is known from Fig. 12(b) that the setting range
for ζ is 1.9 ≤ ζ ≤ 4.35 under strong turbulence conditions.
Thus, by applying this constraint in Fig. 13, it is seen that
the QKD system is secured (i.e., S > 0) when Eve is located
at least 1.7 km away from Alice when ζ = 1.9. Similarly,
under weak turbulence conditions (Fig. 14), the QKD system
is secured when Eve is located at least 1.5 km away from
Alice when ζ = 1.2. As a result, to guarantee positive secret-
key rates, it is necessary to select the smallest possible ζ in the
selection ranges corresponding to each turbulence conditions.
FIGURE 15. Final key-creation rate (Rf ) versus peak transmitted
power (P) in dBm. δ = 0.4, LA,B = 1 km, LE,A = 1.5 km, g¯ = 15,
C2n = 10−15 (modeled by LN), C2n = 5× 10−14 and C2n = 10−13 (modeled
by GG).
Finally, the final key-creation rate Rf is investigated versus
the peak transmitted power P in Fig. 15 with system settings
(δ = 0.4, ζ = 1.2) for weak turbulence and (δ = 0.4, ζ =
1.9) formoderate-to-strong turbulence. Eve’s location is fixed
at LE,A = 1.5 km (i.e., 500 m behind Bob’s receiver).
As expected, the setting of ζ imposes an explicit effect on Rf ,
as it controls Psift . Consequently, under weak turbulence
condition (C2n = 10−15) with ζ = 1.2, Rf = 10 Mbps
can be achieved at P = −2.5 dBm. It is noteworthy that
increasing P more than -2.5 dBm leads to a reduction in
Rf , since it increases the mutual information between Alice
and Eve I (A;E). On the other hand, under moderate and
strong turbulence conditions (C2n = 5 × 10−14 and C2n =
10−13, respectively), with ζ = 1.9, Rf is reduced since
Bob’s Psift is smaller. To maximize Rf , choosing appropriate
values of P becomes crucial, i.e., P = −2 dBm and P =
−1.5 dBm under moderate and strong turbulence conditions,
respectively. It is also seen that Rf at optimal P under strong
turbulence is higher than that under moderate turbulence, e.g.,
up to 5.2 Mbps compared to 3.6 Mbps, respectively. This
is logical as I (A;E) is reduced when turbulence becomes
stronger under the same setting of ζ .
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE OUTLOOK
We proposed a novel QKD protocol using SIM/BPSK and
D-T/DD receiver with an APD, which can be feasibly
implemented on standard FSO systems. The design criteria
under practical security constraints for FSO transmitter and
receiver, in particular, themodulation depth and the setting for
dual-threshold selection, were comprehensively discussed.
For performance analysis, important secrecy metrics includ-
ing QBER, ergodic secret-key rate, and final key-creation rate
were analytically derived in novel closed-form expressions
in terms of finite power series, considering the impact of
atmospheric channel and receiver noises. Finally, analytical
results were further verified by M-C simulations.
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The results in this paper proved that QKD function can
be achieved based on the pulse-based signal level of a laser
beam as in standard optical systems. This helps to reduce the
deployment cost of future secured networks since standard
telecommunication devices can be used, instead of costly
and sophisticated single-photon equipment. Consequently,
performance analysis and improvement techniques inherited
from the rich literature of standard FSO systems can be
straightforwardly applied on the proposed free-space QKD
system. In the future, it is promising to experimentally imple-
ment the proposed QKD protocol in practical FSO systems to
verify its feasibility and security efficiency over both horizon-
tal and space communication links. Further physical impair-
ments such as pointing errors and weather effects should
also be taken into account. Different improvement techniques
(e.g. diversity and relaying techniques) and various error cor-
rection methods (e.g. bidirectional or reverse reconciliation)
could be investigated to improve the secrecy performance and
final key-creation rate of the future QKD systems.
Appendix
A PROOF OF THE JOINT PROBABILITIES IN (25) AND (26)
Substituting (11) and (12) into (22) with a = 0, we obtain the
expression for PA,B(0, 0) as
PA,B(0, 0) = 12
∫ ∞
0
Q
(
− 14<g¯Pδhlht−d0
σN
)
× 1√
8pihtσx
exp
(
−
[
ln(ht )+2σ 2x
]2
8σ 2x
)
dht . (48)
Making the change of variable y =
(
ln(ht )+2σ 2x
)
√
8σx
, (48) can be
rewritten as
PA,B(0, 0) = 12√pi
∫ ∞
−∞
Q
(
− 14<g¯Pδhle2
√
2σxy+2µx−d0
σN (y)
)
× exp
(
−y2
)
dy, (49)
where
σN (y)=
√
2qFAg¯2<
[
1
4
Pδhle2
√
2σxy+2µx+Pb
]
1f+4kbT
RL
1f,
(50)
d0=E[i0]− ζ
√
σ 2N (y). (51)
Using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature formula [37]∫ ∞
−∞
g (y) exp(−y2)dy ≈
k∑
i=−k,i6=0
ωig (xi) , (52)
where k is the order of approximation, {ωi} and {xi}
(i = −k,−k + 1, ...− 1, 1, 2, ..., k) are the weight factors
and the zeros of the Hermite polynomial, respectively,
we obtain the closed-form solution for PA,B(0, 0). By follow-
ing similar procedures, closed-form solutions for PA,B(a, 0)
and PA,B(a, 1), a ∈ {0, 1}, can be derived as in (25) and (26),
respectively.
A PROOF OF THE JOINT PROBABILITIES IN (30) AND (31)
Substituting (11) and (14) into (22) with a = 0, we obtain the
expression for PA,B(0, 0) as
PA,B(0, 0) = 12
∫ ∞
0
Q
(
− 14<g¯Pδhlht−d0
σN
)
×2 (αβ)
(α+β)/2
0 (α) 0 (β)
(
ht
)α+β
2 −1Kα−β
(
2
√
αβht
)
dht. (53)
To facilitate our calculation, the PDF of GG distribution
in (53) can be efficiently approximated by an MG distribu-
tion, as recently proposed in [38]. Thus, (53) can be rewritten
as
PA,B(0, 0)= 12
N∑
i=1
ai
∫ ∞
0
Q
(
− 14<g¯Pδhlht−d0
σN
)
× (ht )bi−1 exp(−ξiht )dht , (54)
where N is the number of mixture components; ai, bi, and ξi
are the parameters of anMG distribution approximating a GG
distribution, readily given as [38]
ai = θi∑N
j=1 θj0
(
bj
)
ξ
−bj
j
, bi = α, (55)
ξi = αβti , θi =
(αβ)α wit
−α+β−1
i
0 (α) 0 (β)
. (56)
Making the change of variable y = ξiht , (54) can be
expressed as
PA,B(0, 0)= 12
N∑
i=1
aiξ
−bi
i
∫ ∞
0
Q
(− 14ξi<g¯Pδhly−d0
σN (y)
)
× ybi−1 exp(−y)dy, (57)
where
σN (y)=
√
2qFAg¯2<
[
1
4ξi
Pδhly+Pb
]
1f + 4kbTFn
RL
1f , (58)
d0=E[i0]− ζ
√
σ 2N (y). (59)
Now, applying the Gaussian-Laguerre quadrature
method [37]∫ ∞
0
g (y) exp(−y)dy ≈
M∑
l=1
νlg (τl) , (60)
where νl and τl are the weight factors and abscissas of
the Laguerre polynomials, with M is the number of itera-
tion to numerically approximate Laguerre integration [37,
Table 25.9]; g(y) = Q
(− 14ξi <g¯Pδhly−d0
σN (y)
)
ybi−1, we obtain the
closed-form solution forPA,B(0, 0). By following similar pro-
cedures, closed-form solutions for PA,B(a, 0) and PA,B(a, 1),
a ∈ {0, 1}, can be derived as in (30) and (31), respectively.
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First, the matrix of transmission probabilities of the consid-
ered BEC with errors can be expressed as
[P (B|A)] =
[
p q (1− p− q)
(1− p− q) q p
]
. (61)
The output probabilities can be calculated from the input
probabilities and the channel matrix as follows
[P (B)] = [P (A)] [P (B|A)]
= [α 1−α] [ p q (1−p−q)
(1−p−q) q p
]
= [91 q 92] , (62)
where
91 = αp+ (1− α) (1− p− q) , (63)
92 = α (1− p− q)+ (1− α) p. (64)
On the other hand, the joint probability matrix [P (A,B)] can
be calculated as
[P(A,B)]=
[
α 0
0 1− α
]
[P (B|A)]
=
[
αp αq α (1−p−q)
(1−α)(1−p−q)(1−α) q (1−α) p
]
. (65)
From (62) and (65), the entropy of the channel output H (B)
and the conditional entropy H (B|A) can be derived as
H (B) = −
3∑
j=1
P
(
yj
)
log2P
(
yj
)
= −91log291 − qlog2q−92log292. (66)
H(B|A) = −
3∑
j=1
2∑
i=1
P
(
xi, yj
)
log2P
(
yj|xi
)
= H(B)+plog2p+qlog2q+(1−p−q)log2(1−p−q).
(67)
Finally, the expression of I (A;B) in (39) can be derived by
I (A;B) = H (B) − H (B|A), with H (B) and H (B|A) are from
(66) and (67), respectively.
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